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HANS SCHILDERMAN
LITURGY AS A SPIRITUAL PRACTICE
SUMMARY — Liturgy, or public worship, represents one of the main 
spiritual practices that offers a pathway to God. Liturgy is characterized 
both by a relation between liturgical form (texts and ritual formularies) 
and its meaning (holy things signified), and a relation between liturgical 
practices (textual and ritual expressions) and its participants (those that 
interpret liturgy in the act). This contribution clarifies the structural 
cohesion of form, meaning, practice and participation from a hermeneu-
tical perspective, as informed by the anthropology of the French philoso-
pher Ricoeur. In this account of liturgy as spiritual practice, five herme-
neutical steps will be taken. First, the history of liturgy will be clarified 
by focussing on some problems of etymology, development and adapta-
tion. This procedure is critically reflected in a second step, that eluci-
dates a liturgical dialectic of text and action. A third step discusses liturgy 
from an aesthetical and dramatic perspective; a necessary view to under-
stand liturgy as an enacted practice. Fourthly, the moral qualities are 
clarified that are assumed to link the practice of liturgy to the identity of 
participants. A fifth step concludes the hermeneutical procedure by indi-
cating the religious significance of liturgy by assessing its call and response 
structure and ultimate translucency of God. In their coherence, these 
five steps represent a hermeneutical analysis of the spiritual practice of 
liturgy.
Liturgy is public worship and as such it represents one of the main spiritual 
practices. It is studied among a wide variety of disciplines, both in humanities, 
such as theology or religious studies, and in social sciences like anthropology or 
sociology. In understanding liturgy as a spiritual practice, typical religious 
aspects come to the fore, even if they emphasize such different aspects as the 
canonical formularies of ritual conduct, the sacramental focus of expressed 
beliefs, the pious attitudes of devotion, the clerical status of pastors and the 
communal service to God. In this complex of meanings, the spiritual practice of 
liturgy represents one of the pathways to God that is expressed in a sequence of 
solemn acts along which specific spiritual practices are ordered, such as prayer, 
exhortation, meditation, adoration, contemplation, music, or simply silence. 
Self-evident as these spiritual characteristics may seem from the insider perspec-
tives of shared faith and church tradition; they often seem to be indistinct or 
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off-agenda from the outsider perspective of secular academic research. Spiritual-
ity increasingly comes to be defined in social scientific terms, as an inner expe-
riential attitude towards life that displays an existential or religious quest orien-
tation. Thus, it comes to be understood as the personal selection, interpretation 
and validation of an ultimate identity, be it in reference of existential or reli-
gious traditions or not.1 Although these social scientific studies contribute sig-
nificantly to our understanding of spirituality, they do not represent the core 
and conceptual breadth of spirituality when looked upon from a theological or 
philosophical perspective of liturgical practice.2
To rephrase it positively, social scientific definitions of spirituality could 
benefit from a humanities approach that after all harbours the classic study of 
spirituality. Waaijman has rightfully pointed out that there are two basic rela-
tions to be observed in liturgical spirituality:3 both the relation between liturgi-
cal form (texts and ritual formularies) and its meaning (holy things signified), 
and the relation between liturgical practices (textual and ritual expressions) and 
its participants (those that interpret liturgy in the act). How is this relationship 
of form, meaning, practice and persons to be interpreted? This is the main 
question that I aim to explore in this contribution. In characterizing liturgy as 
a spiritual practice, I will not elaborate the varieties that characterize Christian 
liturgy in its rich phenomenology of expressions and experiences. Although I 
will tacitly assume a Roman-Catholic type of liturgy, my focus here will merely 
be to clarify some philosophical and theological notions that in my view are 
crucial when looking at liturgy from a perspective of practiced spirituality. In 
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doing so, I hope to offer a modest contribution to a discussion of the founda-
tions of spirituality as Waaijman has pointed them out, namely as a shared 
interdisciplinary effort of theology and philosophy; as a critical reflection on 
the idea of spiritual experience; as a correction to popular and privatized con-
cepts of spiritual meaning; and as an intelligible access to an understanding of 
spiritual traditions.4
In this contribution I will account for this by following some hermeneutic 
guidelines in my argumentation. One of the main points of attention in that 
endeavour implies the necessity to be historical and critical in defining spiritual 
characteristics of religious practices, and to develop a keen eye for the norma-
tive meanings that are inherent in its aesthetic, moral and religious characteris-
tics. This in my view requires a humanities approach in the spiritual study of 
liturgy that is hermeneutical through and through. I derive this hermeneutical 
procedure from the anthropology of French philosopher Ricoeur.5 The choice 
for this philosopher is one for many reasons. Ricoeur without a doubt inte-
grates the thought of many twentieth-century philosophers while introducing 
proper notions for explaining and interpreting classical texts in philosophy and 
theology alike. His unparalleled impetus to develop a ‘hermeneutics of suspi-
cion’ draws attention to the need to critically deal with an understanding of 
tradition. This offers an outstanding opportunity to confront the textual, lin-
guistic and narrative approaches in theological thought with the characteristics 
of modernity. In his magisterial ‘oneself as another’ Ricoeur draws together 
three core issues that typify the yield of his thought: action, identity and time. 
The problematic that these issues reflect will offer a searchlight for the problem 
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of this contribution: how spiritual characteristics of liturgical practice are to be 
understood. Though Ricoeur does not offer a comprehensive theology, let alone 
a systematic reflection on liturgy, he does provide anthropological notions that 
will prove to be relevant in arguing a point that I want to make in this contri-
bution. 
In order to develop a systematic account of liturgy as spiritual practice, I will 
take five methodical steps that – I hope – may contribute to a hermeneutical 
study of spirituality. First of all, it is necessary to account for the history of 
liturgy as spiritual practice. Without this account, traditions of interpretation 
are overlooked which would fail the hermeneutical program by definition. Sec-
ondly, a critical step is taken in which hermeneutical interpretation reflects on 
the history of liturgy as spiritual practice. In trying to address this practice as 
practice a third step of aesthetical analysis comes to the fore, in which I will 
deal with the question of the attractiveness of liturgy. The fourth step reflects a 
major inference, namely that the spiritual practice of liturgy is of moral signifi-
cance, and represents a core value to those that participate. Finally in the fifth 
step it is shown that a religious perspective is leading in characterizing the spir-
itual identity of liturgy. The latter step is not to be taken as the exclusive or 
final taxonomic characteristic to define a spiritual identity of liturgical practice. 
The hermeneutical approach implies that all steps represent a reflective under-
standing of spirituality in liturgy and avoid that it is defined according to the 
obvious religious characteristics that take liturgy from the outset only in its 
traditional and canonical form. The idea of this contribution is that there is a 
primordial significance to be attached to the study of liturgy as praxis, the 
hermeneutical analysis of which has to decide over the validity of its spiritual 
characteristics.6 What goes for spirituality appeals to liturgy as well, namely that 
is an action, a task, a participatory effort.7 
1. LITURGY AS HISTORICAL PRACTICE 
To start, I will elaborate a concept that understands liturgy as a spiritual prac-
tice by a community in which it configures its faith by ritual means of expres-
sion. I hope to sketch the relevance of this notion of practice for spirituality by 
indicating that this concept is historically implied in the terminology of liturgy. 
This is not meant as a historic overview of the notion of liturgy as practice. 
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I will limit myself from the outset to a brief sketch of some origins of, and 
changes in, the terminology of liturgy as a spiritually relevant theological con-
cept.
Etymological Notion 
From etymological reference, we know that liturgy seems to have been under-
stood in close connection with religious practices. Phrased in its simplest form, 
liturgy is ‘worship by people to God’. The old Anglo-Saxon word ‘weorthscipe’ 
simply means ‘worth-ship’, which literally is ‘shaping worth’. In ancient times 
it indicated an attained merit; or the process by which a person gains personal 
quality. It then refers to the kind of status that is build on respect, resulting 
into expressed honour.8 This display of dignity and esteem has a religious deno-
tation in worship in the sense that honour and respect is awarded to God, or to 
sacred persons and objects. However, – if one wants to follow the root-phrase 
– there is always a notion of personal respect of oneself involved as well.9 There-
fore one can maintain that worship involves moral notions which turns liturgy 
into a notion that is relevant to ethical reflection.
The term liturgy has a characteristic practical religious meaning in its Judaic 
and Christian use. The notion of liturgy has its roots in Biblical language as it 
was used in Hebrew and Greek contexts. The Old Testament employs the 
notion of worship in at least three different wordings. The Old Testament first 
of all refers to worship in the Hebrew: wcc (‘shachach’) which literally means 
‘to be/become low’. It is a term that indicates the action of bowing one’s body, 
or even prostration.10 In the Genesis narratives of Abraham this physical act of 
bowing down has clear connotations of social respect (Gen 18:1) and religious 
reverence (Gen 22:5). In the Biblical aversion against idolatry, ‘shahah’ is also 
used (Ex 20:5). A second and frequent expression is ybd (‘abad’) (used 290 
times in the Old Testament). ‘Abad’ is the service that one shows to things, to 
people or to God. If ‘abad’ is directed towards God it loses its connotations that 
are connected to serving things or persons: it reflects joy instead of slavery or 
bondage (Ex 3:12; 4:23; 7:16; 10:26; Ps 22:31; Job 21:15; Jer 2:20; Mal 3:14), 
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unless the service is directed to other gods (Deut 7:16; 2 Kings 10:18-19, 
21-23, etc.).11 ‘Abad’ literally means labour or service; words to which the 
Greek words liturgy and diacony are closely related. ‘Ebed Jahweh’ refers to the 
theological motive of God’s servant which expresses the mutual obligation of 
fidelity between God and man. The word dgÌsï (‘sagid’) is an alternative term in 
the Old Testament, which indicates a display of respect and honour.12 It is 
sometimes directed against idolatry as well (Dan 3:5-18).
The New Testament both employs ‘proskunéw’ which means bowing low or 
falling at another’s feet in reverence (like in Mt 4:10; Jn 4:25); and ‘leitourgia’ 
that refers to service, both in the sense of ministry (2 Cor 9:12; Acts 13:2) and 
in the denotation of offering or sacrifice. In the wording of the New Testament 
a religious and a ritual notion of liturgical practice can be distinguished. Ini-
tially, the term liturgy had no religious connotations as it referred to a volun-
tary taking up of a service for a common good. The Greek word ‘leitourgia’ 
(from ‘latreúw’) refers to service which expresses the personal relationship of 
private and public concerns. It is a compound noun of the words ‘l¢óv’ (peo-
ple) and ‘érgon’ (practice or action). This relationship of public and private 
matters initially was understood as a voluntary affair: materially or intellectually 
gifted people could decide to commit to a public concern by spending funds or 
by active participation. In subsequent denotations, the voluntary aspect gradu-
ally weakened as the state could explicitly demand qualified individuals to take 
up specific public services. Liturgy became to be understood as the assignment 
of public services to qualified people, especially in their financial support for 
choruses, athletic games, state ceremonies or wars. Later, any service could be 
defined in terms of liturgy. The religious notion of liturgical practice closely 
follows the connotation of public service in that it emphasizes the service of 
Christians to others as a duty following from one’s belonging to the Kingdom 
of God. Following this notion, liturgy has characteristics of a personal decision 
to believe: that is to faithfully engage oneself in public matters according to the 
root-symbol of Christian belief: the Kingdom of God. Liturgy is putting your-
self in unselfish service of the Kingdom of God (2 Cor 9:12; Phil 2:30). The 
ritual notion of liturgical practice refers to the actual worship of God in specific 
sacrificial actions as they are paradigmatically represented by Jesus Christ, the 
high-priest (Lk 1:23; Phil 2:17; Heb 8:6; 9:21). In the latter sense – and more 
specifically – the Eucharist is understood as liturgy. Though the religious notion 
of liturgy can be considered to be implied in the ritual aspect, one can maintain 
that the latter definition gained significance and guides the connotations we 
nowadays have of liturgical practice. 
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In following the various terms that in the Judeo-Christian tradition became 
indicative of the practice of liturgy, the notion of service offers a kind of con-
necting link in the interpretation history of liturgy. It struggles with the ques-
tion ‘whom should you serve: things, men, or God?’ The answers to this ques-
tion are not as evident as they may seem; at least these root-notions of liturgy 
also define some of the basic religious and theological issues that became preva-
lent in this Judeo-Christian tradition. What is appropriate ritual service: an 
offering of cattle or of crops? Are we allowed to venerate images or should we 
abstain from that? Is there an analogy of serving God and of serving people? 
How do we deal with the opposite – but analogous – notions of slavery and 
service? Without answering these questions here, it is clear that liturgy as a term 
to indicate a practice ties up in a specific historic tradition of defining and 
interpreting this practice. Liturgy is practice, expressed in physical acts but con-
nected throughout with complex moral and religious implications that ask for 
explanation and interpretation.13
Developmental Notion
Not only the etymological reference but also the historical development of lit-
urgy as a concept can be understood as referring to basic characteristics of prac-
tices. The actual development of Christian liturgy, for instance, has been stud-
ied from a number of historical perspectives, usually phased according to the 
periods of the apostolic age, the patristic period, the (early, high and late) medi-
eval period, Reformation, Counter-reformation and Baroque, and finally mod-
ern and contemporary times.14 In each of these phases, the practice of liturgy 
went through basic changes. We can study these changes with regard to the 
resulting consequences for the liturgical formulas and prescriptions. However, 
one can and should also take the perspective that these changes are – sometimes 
pragmatic – adaptations to varying and changing socio-cultural environments. 
Taking into account the perennial history and global dissemination of Christian 
liturgy, the question arises how liturgy adapts to its changing contexts of time 
and place: by fitting its socio-historical environment to its worship structure 
(assimilation) or by fitting this worship structure to its socio-historic environ-
ment (accommodation)?15 History by all means shows that it did both.
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In the development of liturgy during the apostolic time, there are clear indi-
cations of strong accommodation by the initial church of its liturgy to – or even 
identification with – Jewish facilities for church, ministry, calendar, worship 
structure and sacraments.16 The main adaptive liturgical problem of the patris-
tic period is probably the Constantine turn (313), which took Christians from 
their private communities into the public realm and which integrated facilities 
and status-characteristics of Roman administration in Christian liturgy. This 
accommodation was necessary to service the huge new masses of Christians, but 
it also institutionalized a clerical class that presided over these services, simply 
by employing the available cultural and political models. In the Middle Ages 
one of core problems was how to integrate the conception of liturgical myster-
ies as it crystallized from the discussions during the patristic period into a recep-
tion of ancient Greek and rising Islamic philosophy. The discussion about the 
efficacy of the sacraments regarding its intentional requisites and objective func-
tions asked for philosophical clarifications and underpinnings of liturgical prac-
tices. It goes without saying that this conceptual process of accommodation to 
new philosophical insights had a significant impact on definitions of church, 
faith and liturgical rites.
Not only accommodation, also assimilation offered opportunities to adjust to 
changing circumstances. The influence of the Roman-Catholic church assimi-
lated the culture at that time to a considerable extent, ranging from ritual pre-
scriptions of daily life to liturgical ceremonies that celebrated the major political 
events. It permeated reality as the obvious frame of reference for religious prac-
tices. The Reformation took up the religious challenge that was implied in the 
far-reaching adaptive mechanisms of these religious practices. The Reformation 
criticized the abundant and even excessive ritual expressions in liturgy and its 
imminent merger with secular issues and interests. It asked instead for a more 
close and authentic approach of the core elements in Christian worship. In a 
return to the biblical foundations of faith and worship the Reformation refor-
mulated its socio-cultural environment anew. This Protestant adaptation pro-
cess can be characterized as an accommodation process with regard to a re-
sourcing in its Biblical foundation that led to new and more austere liturgy. 
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However, it also has characteristics of assimilation in the changing religious 
culture that it brought about by dissociating liturgy from what was seen as 
accessory, secularized or irrelevant to a biblical understanding of worship. The 
Catholic defensive reaction to the rigid adaptation of protestant churches was 
expressed in an exclusive focus at its liturgical identity. During the phase of 
Counter-reformation and Baroque the Congregation of Rites was established 
and gained strong influence. Liturgical practices became characterized both by a 
clerical focus on consecration activities and by popular participation in para-
liturgical practices.
In modern times Christian churches demonstrate a variety of liturgical prac-
tices. One can distinguish on a continuum at one pole those churches that 
maintain strict orders for worship that are considered essential to their respec-
tive confession, and at the other pole those churches that have flexible liturgical 
prescriptions that connect worship and confession in a more flexible manner. 
Churches at the first pole are ‘liturgical churches’: they subordinate the specific 
form of liturgy to the confession. Liturgical forms are at the centre of worship; 
symbolized for instance by the central position of the altar. They have fixed 
formulas for prayer, Mass-order and specific rites, strictly vouchsafed by a 
strong church agency. Roman-Catholic, Eastern-Orthodox, the Oriental (non-
Chalcedonian) Church, some Anglican and some Lutheran churches can be 
called a liturgical church. At the other pole there are ‘free-worship churches’, 
which principally distinguish between confession and worship and therefore 
can be more flexible in adapting liturgy to specific circumstances. They tend to 
be economical in their ritual expressions, and leave room for adaptation to local 
insights and communal forms of authority. Confession is important but it is 
not the umbrella term for all worship. Most protestant denominations can be 
considered free-worship churches. They have an ‘order of worship’ but as com-
pared to the liturgical churches, it is not as central to their religious self-defini-
tion. One could hypothesize that liturgy in free-worship churches is character-
ized by a disposition towards continuous accommodation, whereas liturgical 
churches may be more susceptible to discontinuous assimilative processes of 
change. I will offer an example in favour of this hypothesis by shortly sketching 
one characteristic aspect of the liturgical renewal in the Roman-Catholic church 
in the twentieth century. 
When Pope Pius X issued his moto proprio on church music (‘Tra le solleci-
tudine’, 1903), he employed the term actuosa participatio to indicate the neces-
sity that all church members should be actively participating in church liturgy.17 
The leaders of the Liturgical Movement (Beauduin, Casel) recognized this 
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appeal as need for all faithful to engage in the mysteries of the church. And in 
subsequent documents, such as the encyclical letter ‘Mediator Dei’ (1947), this 
concern was officially emphasized, to subsequently gain a significant place in 
the decree on the Holy Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council ‘Sacrosanctum 
Concilium’ (SC).18 In this document, the need for active participation is not 
only repeatedly stressed (SC 11, 14, 19, 21, 26, 27, 30, 41, 50, 79, 114, 121, 
124), but also specified as a participation both internal and external (SC 19), 
more conscious (SC 11, 48, 79), more fully (SC 14, 21, 41), more perfect (SC 
55), more communal (SC 21, 27), more pious (SC 48, 50), more beneficial 
(SC 11), and easier to perform (SC 79).19 Therefore one can argue that the 
emphasis on actuosa participatio at least in principle motivates the communion-
ecclesiology of the second Vatican council, at least for those who want to engage 
and actually do participate in liturgy.20 A fact is that Pope Paul VI replaced the 
Tridentine Mass in 1969 by the ‘Novus Ordo Missae’ that departs from new 
role-sets in liturgy. It explicitly defines liturgy as a church practice of significa-
tion by those that actively participate in liturgy. Accordingly, liturgy is defined 
in theological terms (SC I, 7) as follows:
Rightly, then, the liturgy is considered as an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus 
Christ. In the liturgy the sanctification of the man is signified by signs perceptible 
to the senses, and is effected in a way which corresponds with each of these signs; 
in the liturgy the whole public worship is performed by the Mystical Body of 
Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head and His members. From this it follows that 
every liturgical celebration, because it is an action of Christ the priest and of His 
Body which is the Church, is a sacred action surpassing all others; no other action 
of the Church can equal its efficacy by the same title and to the same degree. 
Also in church law, this public character of liturgy is emphasized, like in the 
new Codex of 1983 (CIC, can. 837, §1-2):
Liturgical actions are not private but are celebrations of the Church itself as the 
‘sacrament of unity’, that is, the holy people united and ordered under the Bish-
ops. Accordingly, they concern the whole body of the Church, making it known 
93799_SIS 20_2010_11.indd   280 13/01/11   08:58
 LITURGY AS A SPIRITUAL PRACTICE 281
21 Codex Iuris Canonici. http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P2S.HTM
and influencing it. They affect individual members of the Church in ways that 
vary according to orders, role and actual participation. Since liturgical matters 
by their very nature call for a community celebration, they are, as far as possible, 
to be celebrated in the presence of Christ’s faithful and with their active partici-
pation.21 
The example of the liturgical renewal in the Roman-Catholic church redefines 
liturgy in ways that break with the ancient liturgical dichotomy of priests and 
lay participants with its respective roles of activity and passivity in liturgical 
practice. One can of course question the institutional impact of this change for 
the actual ritual participation of lay-people in church, but regarding liturgy, the 
change was effected instantaneously. Striking is that, though participatory and 
community oriented issues were at the middle of attention in theological dis-
course, the liturgical renewal was effectuated ‘by decree’ without any consulta-
tion of the faithful, thereby emphasizing responsibility in liturgical issues as a 
matter that is still left best to the discretion of the administrative body of the 
church. It is characteristic of the way in which a liturgical church both adapts 
to new circumstances while maintaining firm control over its order of worship. 
It ‘steers’ its assimilation by way of policy to avoid running the alleged risks of 
a gradual and decentred accommodation process of its liturgy.
2. LITURGY AS CRITICAL PRACTICE
In having drawn attention to the historical adaptation process of liturgy, I will 
now elaborate a critical approach to understand liturgy as a spiritual practice. 
Liturgy is not simply given by history, but reflects an ongoing practice of expla-
nation and interpretation to appropriate this history as a tradition that is sig-
nificant to present and future times. Critical-hermeneutic reflection refers to 
the explanation and interpretation of tradition, especially when problems of 
adaptation require this. The liturgical adaptation processes cannot be seen apart 
from an ongoing critical reflection on the interpretation of liturgy’s history. 
This history shows that liturgy had always been a plural practice and as a con-
cept was object of various interpretations that sometimes harmonized and at 
other occasions resulted in conflict. This variety that history displays reflects a 
fundamental inaccessibility of tradition as a unitary or unambiguous framework 
for contemporary action. Every tradition thrives within the contingencies that 
history describes. The pith of hermeneutics therefore is one of interpretative 
effort. Hermeneutic reflection at best represents an appropriation of reality in 
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recognition of the fact that the effort does not yield in ultimate answers. It by 
definition lacks the ability to gain control over the issues of life; it merely 
redresses the reality that it interprets.22 When I understand this philosophically, 
there are two sides to this critical practice. One side takes liturgy as text, that is, 
as a cohering representation system of (religious) signs handed down to us by 
former generations to guide our practice of liturgy. The other side takes liturgy 
as practice from which we interpret these texts in liturgical action. The two 
sides represent two critical perspectives to interpret liturgy. This I will now 
elaborate by employing some insights of Ricoeur.
From Liturgical Text to Liturgical Action
One wonders how liturgical practices have maintained their Christian iden-
tity throughout their perennial history, their global dissemination, and their 
conflicts at the numerous intersections of discordant religious voices. Even if 
one carefully focuses at differences between Christian churches of different 
confession, at different times and within various contexts, it remains striking 
to notice the similarities in expression and comprehension of elementary 
liturgical forms of meaning. How can one understand this identity of liturgy 
from the contingencies of history? One of the obvious explanations is of 
socio-historical nature: the Christian traditions deeply ingrained western cul-
ture since they were supported by religious monopolies, strong political liai-
sons, firm church structures and rigid pastoral authorities, and because these 
traditions were underpinned by the intellectual expertise of theological and 
philosophical schools. From a hermeneutical point of view however, universal 
explanations such as these are not appropriate. Ricoeur is one of the authors 
that stresses the necessity to take this understanding of history not as a mere 
objective reconstructing of past events but as an activity that gains its signifi-
cance from the present. We may have knowledge of the past, but there is no 
universal historical agency that encompasses the positions of particular inter-
preters at given phases of history. Ricoeur recognizes instead that there is a 
collective memory prior to the memories of individual persons. We remem-
ber because our collective memory reflects a discourse that we put trust in. 
History then has characteristics of a ‘testimony’ of the past as it is given to us 
not so much in the form of historical texts as such, but as texts to be read, 
narrated and enacted by us at present times.23 In trusting liturgical texts, we 
may take the moral and religious testimony that it entails as decisive for our 
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liturgical practices. Let us have a closer look at the significance of this testi-
mony in liturgical texts, both in its quality as (diachronical) trust in a recol-
lection from the past and as (synchronical) trust in the dialogue of present 
discourse.
A critical interpretation of history has characteristics of a testimony recol-
lected from the traces that the past has left behind. These traces are embed-
ded in texts, or at least have a ‘text-structure’. In liturgy, we are confronted 
with fixed orders of worship, popular songs and prayers, church architecture, 
paintings with well-known motives, typical ritual gestures, etcetera. These 
‘texts’ cohere not only with regard to the signs that they contain, but also 
with regard to their mutual relationship, that is, as aesthetical and religious 
unity in liturgy. From the perspective of texts, liturgy is a practice of remem-
brance elicited by the testimony that it portrays and that it invites or even 
imputes us to understand. In offering this testimony, texts express a social 
bond over the generations, which acts as a basis for diachronical trust that 
embodies our obligation to the past. The fact that our relationship to history 
has characteristics of a testimony does not imply that history offers unques-
tioned prerogatives for action. A historiographic account has to validate or 
falsify this testimony. This account of history first bases itself on systematic 
collections of traces of the past. These traces embedded in texts are testimo-
nial themselves but also relate to the interpretations of the historicist or litur-
gist, who collects, selects and archives them. Historical facts therefore are 
interpretations of recollections to be scrutinized not so much for their factual 
appearances at given times but for the position they are awarded in archives 
of historians at given times. Secondly, historians or liturgists relate these traces 
of the past in overarching views. In doing so, they take into account the set-
ting of these traces as testimony by specific groups as they are attested to in 
the practices of these groups. This purposiveness of testimonies asks for a 
historiography that critically assesses texts from their significance for histori-
cal practices. In determining this significance, one should take into account 
the implied practical perspectives, such as those of action and suffering; of 
enjoying and enduring; of affirmation and negation. By taking these perspec-
tives, the testimony implied in the text is scrutinized for its validity and reli-
ability in the plural settings of history. There is no valid historical relation-
ship to be established between remained memories without taking into 
account a dynamic of concordant and discordant voices over its testimony. 
Thirdly, in narrating a historian or liturgist is not a mirror of times bygone 
but a rhetorical agent, who favours or discards views of the reconstructed 
testimonies. Historians’ main act is to rewrite histories. The research of his-
tory is interpretative, to be engaged in while taking into account the contin-
gencies of forgotten or vanished memories, and witnessing the vicissitudes of 
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current positions, contexts and times.24 Unlike the well-established liturgical 
texts suggest, the history of liturgical practices demands a critical account of 
interpreting the history of liturgy. There is no liturgical prerogative hatching 
out the history of liturgy. The history of liturgy is interpreted time and again 
as one referring to a shared testimony cherished by each generation anew. To 
explain the continuity of liturgy throughout Christian history demands that 
we take into account our social bond with former generations of Christians 
and of their testimony of Christian identity. Thus the belief-aspect of liturgy 
cannot simply be equated with an agreement on texts of faith, church, or 
ritual. It gains significance from the trust that it was awarded along the his-
tory of generations as testimony crucial to each generation. Critical hermeneutic 
interpretation guides us from texts to practice and therefore is a basic require-
ment to study the spiritual practice of liturgy.
A critical interpretation of history has also characteristics of a testimony in 
present discourse. There can be no bond with history without a synchronical 
trust that we experience in actually reading, narrating and enacting liturgical 
texts against the background of shared current knowledge and contemporary 
communal settings. This significance that historical texts have for the actual 
practice of discourse needs more explanation. One might consider the testimony 
of Christianity that liturgical texts reflect as a self-referential system of its own. 
However, this testimony can only gain significance as soon as one puts it into 
dialogue in rites, in prayer, in sermons, in music, in buildings, in reading reli-
gious texts, etcetera. It gains meaning because in interacting, this testimony 
invites to identify, to draw parallels or to contrast with texts from other times 
and contexts. Discourse is what puts the text of liturgy into action. Whereas the 
text of liturgy stands for a system of (religious) signs; the practice of liturgy 
addresses agents and invites them to decode and encode the text of liturgy. The 
actual decoding and encoding by liturgical agents is a practice of testimony itself. 
It attests the testimony enclosed in liturgical texts anew within the bond from 
which these texts are narrated and enacted. That testimony only survives if it is 
narrated in contemporary times within a communicative setting of shared knowl-
edge and trust. While the text of liturgy is self-referential and relates signs in 
vested patterns, the practice of liturgy refers to a world beyond the text of liturgy 
itself. It implies the personal consciousness of the agents that participate, it refers 
to the socio-cultural context in which these agents live and to the institutional 
bonds and roles to which they are ascribed. These are all put into the perspective 
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of the reality of religious faith and the divine agents that are perceived to act 
from this reality. This hermeneutical approach of the practice of historical testi-
mony in discourse is another way of defining a bond of liturgy. Ritualizing puts 
a faith into practice for which the bond of belonging is crucial.
From Liturgical Action to Liturgical Text 
If I may conclude from the historical perspective that the liturgical text mani-
fests its testimony in the practice of liturgy, what then is the significance of 
liturgical practice for the liturgical text? Is there a relationship of decoding texts 
in practices on the one hand and encoding texts anew from practice on the 
other hand? Hermeneutic analyses may display difficulties answering this ques-
tion, since they have come to be applied mainly in the frameworks of narrative 
analyses. However, since the ‘linguistic turn’ in hermeneutics, one can observe 
a close resemblance between texts and actions. 
This resemblance of texts and actions is expressed in three basic hermeneutic 
approaches from which the perspectives of ‘author’, ‘text’ and ‘reader’ respec-
tively can be matched with the terms of ‘agent’, ‘agency’ and ‘co-agent’. The 
first perspective is that of the author, the initiating agent. For this diachronic 
interpretation the agents’ initial reasons, intentions and significations that 
fuelled his action would be indicative and decisive for understanding practices. 
Thus, we may for instance understand liturgical practice as significant because 
Jesus initiated the Eucharist at the Last Supper, or because evangelists Matthew, 
Marc and Luke report this as Jesus’ crucial testimonial act of remembrance (Mt 
26:26-29; Mk 14:22-25; Lk 22:15-20).25 Thus, if one understands that testi-
mony as a ‘world behind the text’, the practice of liturgy can be said to be 
interpreted. However one could oppose, this approach merely identifies the 
agent (Jesus), not necessarily the practice (the testimony that it reveals) itself. 
Therefore, the second perspective is that of agency; that by which a practice is 
understood as practice reflects the issue that should be taken into account. 
Indeed, agencies have their own logic in selecting and relating signs from texts 
that initially do not necessarily link to an agent. That is especially the case if 
these practices are presented in the most common historical form in which they 
avail themselves, namely narratives. This ‘world of the text’ ‘as it came to us’, 
can be interpreted for its own sake, not referring to current reasons of action, 
intention and meaning. In that case, these practices are taken regardless of their 
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historical or current account and are simply being read as text. We could still 
understand liturgy from the evangelists’ account but notice that the Last Sup-
per belongs to the semantic category of meals that sometimes indicates Jesus’ 
hospitality in the perspective of the Kingdom of God (Jn 6:1-13); or refers to 
confusion of bystanders (Jn 6:48-59), or to betrayal of particular agents (Jn 
13:21-30). The third hermeneutic perspective to take is that of the co-agent, 
who represents ‘the world before the text’. The co-agent is the one who is con-
fronted with the action of another agent and thus becomes practically involved. 
Here practice is interpreted as opportunity for enactment. The interpretation 
may still be guided by the available agency of the text or its ‘archaeology’ from 
an originating agent. However, decisive is that this practice is re-enacted in 
order to ‘recreate’ a practice in an enrolling world. Thus one could understand 
liturgy from the biblical text of the Last Supper as practice of sharing, which 
entails a moral and religious obligation to re-enact Jesus’ metaphorical testi-
mony of an invitational eating and drinking in the practice of our lives.
Even if one would regard the triple world-perspective that texts open up as 
reference for practices, the question remains how a textual testimony integrates 
in the practice of our daily life. Why do we take our refuge to texts in the first 
place? An answer to this question relates to the time-perspective from which 
agents act in practices. There is neither practice nor interpretation without an 
agent who puts himself in practice from the past to the future. This obvious 
fact that practice has temporal characteristics in the agents’ action is by no 
means accidental. It questions our abilities and disabilities with regard to time: 
we act now and we may act in the future, but we do not act in the past. On the 
other hand, we can reconstruct past action but not future action. Our inten-
tions with regard to the future are open for choice but those in the past are 
open only for scrutiny. What is meaningful now may not have been so in the 
past nor will it necessarily be significant in the future. There is a double contin-
gency involved in our perception of past and future. The past confronts us with 
an action contingency since it refers to what we know but cannot change. The 
future confronts us with an epistemological contingency since it refers to what 
we are able to change but do not know. Yet, at present we cannot outrun the 
past nor escape the future. We cannot but deal with time by giving meaning to 
what we do know from the past and to what we can do in the future. In signify-
ing, we close this yawning gap between past and future.26 In his hermeneutic 
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anthropology, Ricoeur understands this signification from the figurative func-
tion of texts to interpret the time perspective in action. Narratives offer time 
perspectives for agents to interpret their action with regard to past and future. 
Actions are understood from their narrative structure as having a beginning, an 
end, and a plot in between, somewhat blurring the notion of reason as immedi-
ate cause of action. This narrative structure of action implies that we interpret 
practices from a plot-structure that unifies multiple actions from narratives into 
opportunities for action assessment and engagement.27 To put it more simply, 
texts offer temporal models of action. This agency-character of narratives bears 
relevance for the encoding of practices. Texts prefigure action by offering narra-
tives within the characteristic intelligibility of a plot structure. This structure 
offers a model that explains actions in terms of the relationship of causes, inten-
tions, significations, effects and values at different but cohering points of time. 
Apart from this pre-figurative function of texts, there is also a figurative mode. 
Narration in actu (discourse) offers opportunities for agents to make sense of 
reality. Reality is not simply ‘event’ but ‘our world’ of shared intentions and 
significations. Historical time as understood from texts and passed down over 
the generations becomes human time as soon as it is narrated in an interpreta-
tion of actual practices. Finally, there is also a re-figurative function of texts to 
be distinguished. Like actions have (intended or unintended) consequences, so 
do texts. Actions create a future world as texts do. Like texts, actions are open 
for interpretation, even to the extent that actions offer alternatives for the text. 
Against the backdrop of a text, a practice recreates actions that challenge the 
interpretations of former times.28 
In the interpretation practice of agents, texts open up realities beyond their 
own scope. This inevitably leads to new texts, or in our liturgical discourse, 
they enable new forms of worship, new songs and prayers, new paintings, new 
church buildings, new rites. But they do so to the extent that they testify from 
a practice of liturgy. Decisive for that is the valid and reliable reconstruction of 
the testimony from history as testified by each generation anew, and the social 
bond of interaction in which we embody this testimony by discourse. But sig-
nificant is also that we interpret the disclosure function of texts in their refer-
ence to the world that we live in, while taking into account that this world is 
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narrated and enacted and cannot be seen apart from the dramatic structure of 
our imagination. This applies to liturgy in a crucial way. Liturgy as it is handed 
down over the generations has characteristics of a text to the extent that its 
testimony acts as a valid and reliable model for liturgical practice for the agents 
involved. In the adaptation problems of each time, the development of liturgi-
cal practice is not so much subjected to the vicissitudes of its context but opens 
up an intrinsic capacity for signification. If the pre-figuration of liturgical prac-
tices structurally hinders the figuration of its current practice at a given time 
and setting, re-figuration appeals to new interpretations for which the texts of 
liturgical practices may offer contrasts and incentives, even when its traditional 
meaning is not followed. 
I will conclude this paragraph by stating that liturgy is a hermeneutical prac-
tice itself. Liturgy is a spiritual practice in which a testimony from liturgical 
texts is decoded and encoded within the dramatic structure of our imagination. 
This confronts us with three major questions that I will deal with in the next 
paragraphs of this contribution. One regards the practiced liturgical text itself 
that derives is quality both from its well-ordered structure and from its appeal 
to and suitability for appropriate action. What is a proper liturgical text? This 
question calls for an aesthetical reflection. The other question is of a moral 
nature, which pushes the variety of interpretations of this text of liturgy at the 
focus of attention. How are we to deal in action with various and sometimes 
even conflicting interpretations of church, faith and ritual in liturgical practice? 
This question calls for a subsequent ethical reflection. Finally, there is the ques-
tion of the reality to which a liturgical text refers. What can we hope for if we 
put our trust in the liturgical text, taking into account that these texts testify 
and promise an ultimate perspective? Here a final theological question is at 
stake.
3. LITURGY AS AESTHETICAL PRACTICE
Liturgy as text is a critical human endeavour, so much we now know. However 
one evaluates the divine inspiration that underlies biblical texts, the spiritual 
depths of prayer, the magnificence of church architecture or the perennial qual-
ity of ritual, these texts – if I may frame them as such – gain spiritual signifi-
cance as human creations. It is only in human activity that the embedded testi-
mony of liturgy can be expressed and in critical self-reflection come to be 
understood. However, one can ask, how does this human activity that is implied 
and intended in liturgical texts actually evoke or create this appeal? One of the 
answers to these questions refers to the aesthetical aspects of liturgical practice. 
The hermeneutics of texts realizes an appeal to the extent that it is beautiful; 
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that it gives evidence of good taste; that is appreciative of performed art. In this 
paragraph, I will clarify what this entails.
Liturgy as Art
By now, we understood that ritual in liturgy represents faith in a communal 
and public way. In this representation, a double hermeneutical task is involved: 
one in which we decode a liturgical text and one in which we encode a liturgi-
cal text. In this double activity, the faith testimony of past generations repre-
sents itself for new generations. However, the way in which we give this act de 
presence in liturgy has specific characteristics of action proper. This activity is of 
ceremonial nature, following highly patterned processes of encoding and decod-
ing. One of the ways to analyze these coding processes is aesthetical and per-
ceives liturgy as form of art.
Is liturgy art? In order to avoid controversial discussions following affirma-
tive answers, we should rephrase the question: if we look at liturgy as a piece of 
art, what do we see? Modern philosophical aesthetics do not answer the ques-
tion of art definitions univocally. The main theories of art define it in various 
ways: art is whatever evokes an aesthetic experience, it is a vehicle to express or 
communicate feelings, or it is best understood as imitation or representation of 
a reality.29 One can observe that definitions of art like these may focus at more 
‘objective’ characteristics of art that relate to the reality-aspects that are repre-
sented, or appeal to more ‘subjective’ aspects that refer to the appreciative side. 
To offer an example of the last view, Collingwood takes art as imaginative 
activity in which the whole self is involved. Art expresses emotions though it 
does not necessarily arouse (these) emotions. As soon however as we do express 
the emotion ourselves, we confer an emotional colour upon the piece of art by 
which we create what it expresses. Therefore, the distinction of an artists’ inten-
tion and the appreciative interpreter is transcended in terms of a shared aes-
thetical activity as it is facilitated by a specific piece of art.30 In emphasizing this 
expressionist view of art, Collingwood avoids approaches like that of Tolstoy’s 
painstaking endeavour to reconstruct the artists’ intentions as milestone of 
beauty. But, arts always refer to shared aesthetics:
[T]he artists’ business is to express emotions; and the only emotions he can 
express are those which he feels, namely his own (…) If he attaches any impor-
tance to the judgment of his audience, it can only be because he thinks that the 
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emotions he has tried to express are (…) shared by his audience (…) In other 
words he undertakes his artistic labour not as a personal effort on his own private 
behalf, but as a public labour on behalf of the community to which he belongs.31
Tatarkiewicz calls for a more analytical definition of art that highlights ele-
ments that both refer to the artists’ intention and to the effects among those 
that perceive art. He includes six characteristics of art: art produces beauty; it 
represents or reproduces reality; it creates forms, it entails an artists’ expression; 
it produces an aesthetical experience, and finally, it produces some kind of 
shock. Therefore, art is: ‘…either a reproduction of things, or a construction of 
forms, or an expression of experiences such that it is capable of evoking delight 
or emotion or shock’.32 Art, and liturgy considered from an aesthetic perspec-
tive, refers to aesthetic intentions, to an aesthetic object – i.e. a piece of art –, 
and to an aesthetic response, related dynamically to a kind of ‘emotional flow’ 
that constitutes the unity of what we call an aesthetic experience.
However, this global answer to our question of the aesthetical quality of lit-
urgy hardly suffices. Modern sourcebooks on art and aesthetics, seldom – if 
ever – refer to liturgy as art. What indeed would be the aesthetic object in lit-
urgy? It could be anything, ranging from church architecture, spiritual music, 
liturgical furniture, ceremonial vessels and vestments, and pious decoration in 
fresco’s or paintings. Roman-Catholic and Protestant views tend to diverge on 
the significance of these objects. These objects can be regarded as beautiful 
while religiously insignificant in themselves, that is, apart from their liturgical 
or religious use. In addition, if one considers these objects religiously significant 
that is, as holy, one runs pre-eminent risks of idolatry and engages in iconoclas-
tic clashes of appreciation. Therefore, one can choose to reject objects as art 
form, but maintain an aesthetic value for textual forms and emphasize the 
beauty of revelation texts as Word of God. This narrative approach can indeed 
be aesthetically assessed as practice: the poems, parables and epics of the Bible, 
a rhetorical aptness of delivery and diction in reading the Scriptures, the proc-
lamation in sermon using symbol and metaphor, an expressed devotional atti-
tude and pious posture in performing rites and the administering of the sacra-
ments. There is without a doubt beauty in the Scriptures and liturgy demands 
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religious empathy in narrating and acting, but is liturgy proper therefore to be 
considered an aesthetical object? To answer this question, I will follow a reversed 
route by indicating comparable forms of art that are regarded to be legitimate 
aesthetical objects. To start right away, one may notice that liturgy can only be 
art in an integrative and performative form. Every art requires a practice in 
which each element could be evaluated aesthetically, but in many cases, it is its 
totality that accounts for the experience that we have of an aesthetical object. 
We judge a book, a photo, or a painting not in the sequential acts implied in 
writing, photographing or painting but only as a presented unity. This however 
is rather different in the performative arts like music and dance. Here, the 
enrolling of action sequences is decisive to appreciate art. Here, art is character-
ized by a participatory extension in time. Joining in during a performance or 
leaving it on beforehand does not destruct the aesthetical experience altogether 
but seriously interrupts the emotional flow that it demands in following and 
appropriating the presented chain of actions. This is all the more so in case of 
theatre or film in which a kind of interpretation is carefully build up and miss-
ing details can seriously hinder the total experience. 
As form of art, liturgy can be compared to theatre to some extent, though 
there are significant differences that demand attention. Liturgy shares with the-
atre the fact that it is a social and public gathering in which a performance takes 
place that people enjoy in certain ways. Both theatre and liturgy reflect shared 
intentions, norms, beliefs, and expectations that are guided by codes of action. 
These codes of action prescribe the performative pattern of action in terms of 
lines, scripts, plots, roles and characters. There is some spatio-temporal dynamic 
in which performed action ‘on stage’ intervenes with the dispositions of theatri-
cal or liturgical audiences, but the codes of action guarantee a certain unity in 
genre, style, movement and tradition. However, as Hamilton points out, 
although theatre is inherently a kind of social activity, it assumes a rather sharp 
distinction between actors and audiences in which the latter usually do not 
require any level of skill in participating.33 Theatre merely displays action and 
thus generates a public in the act. It usually demands of its spectators to be an 
engaged public but only in the sense of a silent emotional commitment. Par-
ticipation in the performative action itself however is usually not considered 
appropriate. In theatre, the public is implied but not made explicit, that is, an 
audience has no lines, it is not present in the script or emplotted in a play, nor 
is its role or character described. In short, the audience that theatre generates is 
not staged, but is implied in a kind of mental screen on which a play is enacted. 
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In liturgy, the art form at first seems quite similar. There are podia (liturgical 
centres such as the altar or the pulpit) that define or at least imply roles and 
rules of engagement, and that distinguish pastoral or ministerial actors and 
choirs from the congregation as such. However, one can hardly overlook the 
fact that pastors, ministers and choirs are part of the congregation. The congre-
gation as such has its roles as well and is participating fully in the performance 
of reading, responding, singing, praying, and participating. In liturgy, there is 
no audience, and if one still would like to hold on to this term, it is a staged 
audience, that is, it presents itself publicly as part of the enacted play.34 One 
can define liturgy as form of art by comparing it to theatre but only to the 
extent that distinctions of actors and audiences are put into perspective. This 
perspective is not accidental but appertains to the art form of liturgy itself. If 
liturgy is theatre, it is so in an ordered structure of shared lines, scripts, plots, 
roles and characters. Even if one would consider liturgy in religious terms as a 
play coram Deo one has to be careful. God is not appropriately to be considered 
an onlooker to a liturgical play, but as an involved actor, at least in an incho-
ative or invocative perspective that the congregation liturgically assumes and 
actually takes in a performative way. What is more, this perspective is not lim-
ited to God but probably involves a highly differentiated heavenly audience. 
Roman-Catholic liturgy illustrates this abundantly. Not only God, but also 
Biblical characters are enacted, such as Prophets, Judges, Kings, Poets, Jesus, 
Mary, the Spirit; or those from tradition like saints; or those that are believed 
present in some way such as the deceased loved ones. What is more, the fact 
that a divine audience is not only implied but also explicitly enacted is clearly 
presented in the liturgical codes of action that not only stage the congregation 
but also divine or at least ‘heavenly’ actors as well in their interaction with the 
congregation. Therefore, this religious solution for solving the problem that 
liturgy does not completely match theatre aesthetically has to be refuted.
To sum up, the definition of liturgy as form of art in terms of a distantiation 
of an artists’ intention and the effects on recipients along the characteristics of 
an aesthetical object is somewhat blurred in liturgy. The performance in liturgy 
always has characteristics of an event in which one is personally and collectively 
enacted in relationship to implied (‘virtual’, supernatural or transcendent) 
actors. In other words, liturgy is not only an aesthetical object but also implies 
an aesthetical subject of interpretation. It is here where we can make a new step 
in the hermeneutics of liturgy as action.
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Liturgy as ‘Act de Presence’ 
In looking back at the aesthetical comparison of liturgy and theatre, what comes 
to the fore is that it is an act of representation. The basic aesthetical form of 
liturgy is that it presents its own action. There are two aspects to this. First, 
liturgy is action, the characteristics of which I will clarify in the Aristotelian 
distinction of making and doing. Secondly, liturgy is imitation. With Ricoeur, 
I will show that this representation is an innovative process throughout. 
Liturgy is first of all action. From the aesthetical perspective that I take here, 
we can question if this action refers to making liturgy (as art piece) or at practic-
ing liturgy (artistically). This question demands a clarification for which Aristo-
tle’s’ notion of action is conducive. In Aristotelian philosophy, practice cannot 
simply be understood as a result of action. In the Nicomachean Ethics we read 
‘Practice and making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, 
then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the 
things that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end other than 
itself, practice cannot; for good practice itself is its end’ (EN VI, 5).35 The Aris-
totelian distinction of theory (qeÉrjma), making (poíßsív), skill (téxnj) and 
practice (prázív) depends on the implied notion of purpose (télov). While the-
ory has a purpose of knowledge pursued for its own sake, productive activity 
(making) has its purpose in some artefact that is realized only after a chain of 
actions has unrolled. Productive activity needs a design that strictly follows an 
elaborated plan to serve an end. This requires skills that demand technical qual-
ities of an agent. However, one should understand these techniques in a broad 
sense of the word. They do not necessarily imply a utilitarian perspective as is 
sometimes maintained. An artist or an actor is also a producer, though he relies 
on aesthetical principles and creative routines in working out his plan. In pro-
ductive activity, the end refers to the goal of an action whereas in practice the 
action is the end itself. Thus, there is a time perspective involved in distinguish-
ing productive activity from practice. In making, the action requires a means 
after which utility an end is realized. This definition of making requires time as 
a measure of efficiency. Practice on the other hand locates its end at each 
moment within the action(-chain) itself. Though practice takes time, its defini-
tion is incompatible with notions of time and efficiency.36 In other words, prac-
tice does not start with a plan or design but with a moral disposition that ques-
tions a situation with regard to its truth and value. Practice requires practical 
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wisdom, which is a commitment of an agent that moves between the require-
ments of specific situations and the general values that guide action. There-
fore, from an Aristotelian perspective, practice requires prudence in action 
(frónjsiv).
From this Aristotelian reflection, one can ask if liturgy should be considered 
as making or as practice. The liturgical text without a doubt should be consid-
ered as referring to making, but the activity that it facilitates is practice. The 
value implicit in the plan or design resulted in the liturgical text, and the enact-
ment of this value in practice accounts for the original qualification of liturgical 
practice. It is the appreciation of this value in practice that relates text to prac-
tice. Ricoeur relates to Kant for establishing the aesthetical character of this 
value judgment that is implied in practice. In traditional aesthetics, this value 
judgment is first of all subjective and a matter of taste, while the value that is 
represented claims a universal character. However, how can one refer to specific 
and personal appreciations while one simultaneously appeals to a universal 
validity of the implied value? Ricoeur summarizes Kant’s answer to this ques-
tion in communicative terms: 
Communicability is the modality of the universal without concepts; it is a matter 
of a powder trail, of contagion from one case to another. And what is thus com-
municated? It is not the rule, nor the case, but the game between understanding 
and imagination. Each of us relives this kind of debate, of conflict, between a rule 
and the imagination, which, in the sublime is found to be affected by overflow-
ing, by the excess of the object over the capacity to include it, whereas in the 
beautiful there is an imagination of harmony. It is this contamination, this pow-
der trail, which involves subjects in communion, in participation in the same 
emotion.37
Liturgy as form of art is both made in following its liturgical design (ars cele-
brandi) and practiced in the appropriation and appreciation of its aesthetic 
value. It thus appeals to pleasure and joy in enacting the liturgical action-chain, 
and it unchains an imaginative power to the extent that it touches and releases 
the value that it displays. If none of these dispositions are addressed, liturgy can 
be criticized for failing to achieve action or performance quality.
As I noticed, liturgy is not just action but one of a specific kind, namely 
imitated or represented action. This imitation needs to be properly under-
stood. It not only repeats actions from the past but – due to the interpretative 
process involved – also recreates the action that it presents. Ricoeurs notion of 
representative action consists of a threefold ‘mimesis’ that subsequently refers 
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to the reconstruction of action, the presentation of action and the renewal of 
action.38 First, representation is reconstruction, a capability to understand 
what needs to be understood and done. As condition of every hermeneutics, 
one has to understand the semantic, symbolical and temporal dimensions of 
action. Action demands knowledge of its conceptual and linguistic structure, 
of the fact that it is based on intentions and will, and that this has conse-
quences for the reality in which we live. It furthermore demands symbolic 
translucency for the context of action, the codes of which reflect the world as 
one of choice. To that comes the understanding that time is not simply an 
objective measure to follow the sequence of our actions, but that time is nar-
rated, put into a semantic and symbolic perspective in such a way that we are 
able to understand and communicate our actions as relevant and significant 
contributions to the world in which we live. Secondly, representation refers to 
the ability to present an action as integrated form. It is enacting (narrating) 
not only as ‘my-act’ (‘my-story’) but also as an effort to integrate it as role 
(voice) in a totality from which it makes sense (narrative). Presentation there-
fore is always a creative act to the extent that this effort succeeds. It demands 
a synthetic capacity to adequately encode an action from its elements and 
shape it flexibly in an order that facilitates a recognition of its significance. 
This encoding process is thus one of imagination. This of course can only be 
done in view of the creative opportunities that language itself offers for com-
munication. Actions and texts are polysemic: they entail more than just one 
meaning and express a surplus of meaning whenever an action is enacted or a 
text is narrated. As soon as actions or texts are communicated, they facilitate a 
poetic function that portrays them against a background of living language. 
This poetic function of communication gives actions and texts their appeal; 
not only fuelled by desired effects but also encoded with a specific interest in 
its intrinsic value. Communication is not merely an instrument to be used for 
its functional opportunities of utility but it also reflects a basic dichotomy of 
signs and objects that installs the polysemic significance of actions and texts as 
such. In Jacobson’s dense terminology of language as communication, the 
poetic function puts the message at the centre of communication by projecting 
the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection (metaphor) to the axis 
of combination (metonym). Poetic style relates the temporal aspect of com-
municating a message (its explanation in terms of cause) to its spatial aspect 
(its semantic choice on the basis of similarities or contrast).39 Thus, there is no 
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blueprint that overarches a signifying order. We simply have to deal with living 
language in which time is always enacted in a coherence of history and fiction, 
memory and hope. Thirdly, representation is renewal of action. Although we 
reconstruct our action from the past and present it with the help of imagina-
tion, it has actual consequences for the world in the sense that it reshapes it. In 
presenting an action we not only communicate but also refer to the world and 
sometimes change it: the inherent claim is not only one of sense but also of 
reference. To the extent that an action is well-ordered, tastefully, beautifully 
enacted it may create new links with the world since we can only appropriate it 
by imagination. Here, especially the metaphor is at play. The appeal to imagi-
nation refers to new sequences of combination, thereby innovating language 
and blazing new routes of imagination. 
Liturgical action represents action. These actions may refer to prayer, rites, 
readings, rhetoric as it comes to us from the past and we represent it for the 
testimony that it entails. However, unless we simply regard it as mnemotechni-
cal or mechanical technique we also have to discover its significance from the 
sketched types of representation. One of the opportunities to do so is to intro-
duce once again the theatrical form, but now in the form of drama and espe-
cially tragedy, that Aristotle regards to be the highest form of aesthetical repre-
sentation.
Liturgy as Drama
The Greek expression of dráma means action, especially in the form of enac-
tion, that is making action object of action. Aristotle understands drama as 
imitation of action in theatrical form (mimßseiv). Drama refers to several genres. 
Thus, a comedy takes people worse as compared to daily life, whereas tragedy 
understands them as better. According to Aristotle, tragedy presents an ideal-
type of imitation. In his Poetica, he refers to tragedy as:
…the imitation of an action; and an action implies personal actors, who neces-
sarily possess certain distinctive qualities both of character and thought; for it 
is by these that we qualify actions themselves, and these – thought and charac-
ter – are the two natural causes from which actions spring, and on actions again 
all success or failure depends. Hence, the Plot is the imitation of the action – 
for by plot I here mean the arrangement of the incidents. By Character I mean 
that in virtue of which we ascribe certain qualities to the agents. Thought is 
required wherever a statement is proved, or, it may be, a general truth enunci-
ated. Every Tragedy, therefore, must have six parts, which parts determine its 
quality – namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song. Two 
of the parts constitute the medium of imitation, one the manner, and three 
the objects of imitation. And these complete the first. These elements have 
been employed, we may say, by the poets to a man; in fact, every play contains 
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Spectacular elements as well as Character, Plot, Diction, Song, and Thought. 
(Aristotle, Poetica VI)40
In tragedy as Aristotle describes it, making and practicing are connected. 
Without making there is no expression, no style nor effect. Without mimetic 
technique, there is no significance for daily life and the dramatic effect fails to 
meet its cause. However, without practice, the plot fails to bestow on a char-
acter its moral quality. It is exactly the unity of making and doing that deter-
mines the quality of tragedy. Aristotle clearly elaborates this in his six qualities 
that vouch for the aesthetic experience of tragedy. Put into order of impor-
tance, they are: plot (muqov), character (ßqj), thought (diánoia), diction (lézív), 
music (melopoiía), and spectacle (óciv). There are specific requirements, espe-
cially for the plot, that account for the dramatic effects and that offer crucial 
requirements to perform drama aesthetically.
Whatever an elaboration of these requirements of good tragedy requires for 
good drama, for our issue a more significant question now comes up. If tragedy 
is rightly considered to be the appropriate form of theatrical drama, can liturgy 
proper be considered from this tragic perspective? The question is controversial 
since we tend to associate liturgy solely with divine or biblical agents. For 
instance, a Christian understanding of Jesus as a tragic hero surely has a basis in 
biblical, and especially prophetic and wisdom narrative, but the tragic meta-
phor fails precisely in the ritual representation of his acts as understood from 
our testimony of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection by God. Why? Classic Greek 
drama requires a tragic hero who experiences a change of fortune based on 
some fatal error of judgement (ámartía) that is usually based on heroic pride 
(Óbriv) which challenges the gods who then pass divine judgment in more or 
less punitive form (díkj). From a Christian perspective, this cannot refer to the 
divine persona liturgiae of Jesus Christ, who is regarded to be without sin and 
not prone to pride or other vices that characterize man. Moreover, Jesus is not 
subject to bad fate and divine punishment, on the contrary. If there is one cru-
cial divine judgment that is represented in Christian liturgy, it is Christ’s’ resur-
rection. However, as I noticed before, in the act of representation we are not 
merely an audience watching a heavenly play but actors ourselves. That is, by 
participating in liturgy we stage ourselves dramatically, for good or ill. That is, 
we try to understand what it is to lead a life that will end at a given moment, 
we try to cope with errors and vices, we deal with emotional ambivalences that 
the reversals of life events necessarily invoke, and we pass on what is of value. 
This is not to say that we are tragic heroes ourselves by (liturgical) definition, 
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but I merely want to highlight here the fact that in the plots of our daily actions 
we search for something serious and universal that is found in the represented 
actions. This indeed is the basic characteristic of tragedy, at least as Aristotle 
defines it: ‘Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, 
and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic 
ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the 
form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper 
purgation of these emotions’ (Aristotle, Poetica VI). The plot is all about a gen-
eral truth (kaqólou) that is pursued within the vicissitudes ambivalences of life. 
Aristotle argues that universals can be discovered in particulars. Tragedy there-
fore is not about misfortune but about the human effort to understand and deal 
with universal truths as they are represented in the events and characters of the 
plot. This observation is significant for an understanding of liturgy as drama. It 
says that in liturgical action we represent ourselves. We give ‘act de presence’ 
and in doing so we deal with the universal and serious truth that a religious 
testimony has for our lives. How we deal with this testimony, is a moral ques-
tion that I will address in the following paragraph on ethics of liturgical prac-
tice. What this universal truth embedded in this testimony is, refers to a reli-
gious question, that I will clarify in a theological paragraph with which I will 
conclude this contribution.
4. LITURGY AS MORAL PRACTICE
The hermeneutical task to interpret the spiritual practice of liturgy demands 
that we take a next perspective into consideration, namely one of ethical nature 
that relates to moral aspects of liturgical practice. If history hands us a testi-
mony, how do we deal with that in liturgy? If liturgy can rightly be understood 
as a challenge to our imagination, or even as drama that confronts us with a 
universal and serious truth that builds our character trough the vicissitudes of 
life, what then is the ethical significance of liturgy? I will deal with these ques-
tions by clarifying a moral perspective in liturgy. I will do so in two steps. First, 
I will clarify an ethical scheme of moral qualities and secondly show how these 
moral qualities are enacted in – and as – liturgical practice. 
Moral Qualities 
In ‘oneself as another’, Ricoeur deals with ethics in close relationship to anthro-
pological issues of personal identity. I will assume that ethics appertain to 
moral qualities of persons and that these qualities are both impelled and 
imputed in liturgical practices. If liturgy is considered as practice from the 
aesthetical perspective of making and doing, one cannot forego the practicing 
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agent. What is more, the serious and general truth that characterizes the dra-
matic and tragic structure of liturgical practice requires that I address the moral 
qualities of the agents who participate in this practice. 
In describing the moral qualities of persons in relationship to practice one 
can firstly ask how agents are morally linked to practices. An initial observa-
tion that can be made with Ricoeur in this regard is that agents have a moral 
identity that is implied in their temporal existence. An agent experiences his 
identity as an appropriated permanence of time from which he infers his 
actions to himself. In this process of inference, two types of causality are 
involved. ‘Idem-identity’ refers to an inference that relates action to the spatio-
temporal sameness of an agent’s identity. Here, the notion of identity refers to 
the fact that in spite of continuous or discontinuous changes in an agent, we 
– and for that matter the agent himself – are still able to recognize that this 
agent is the same person. ‘Ipse-identity’ refers to the capacity to initiate action 
that is imputable to oneself and that one can be kept to by others. This notion 
defines an agent in terms of the responsibility for his action: reliable for one-
self and for another.41 Idem and ipse identity indicate two causal links between 
an action and an agent. They are unified in a belief of assurance that allows 
agents to exist in both domains of causality and thus to be an integrated moral 
agent in practice (‘attestation’). Therefore, if an agent has moral qualities we 
should be able to both identify these qualities as belonging to one and the 
same person, and attribute these qualities as depending on a lasting intention 
and responsibility of that person towards intentions, causes and effects of his 
actions. 
One logically following observation is that the other is implied as the one 
confronted with somebody’s actions and therefore undergoing or suffering the 
actions of an agent. In fact, this notion of passivity – one being subjected to 
another – is present as passivity in each activity of an agent. It follows from the 
notion of identity since identity requires that an agent identifies himself with 
somebody else or something other. Since that other is assumed in the narrated 
identity of the acting agent, he is liable to interpret the subjected other from a 
moral perspective. Thus, the dynamic notion of identity both implies and 
evokes a moral stance towards another. This idea of ‘another’ has characteristics 
of passivity in the action from which a person impels and imputes his identity. 
Or, to frame it in the reverse, ‘passivity becomes the attestation of otherness’ in 
the following triad:
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First there is the passivity represented by the experience of one’s own body – or 
better (…) of the flesh – as the mediator between the self and a world which is 
itself taken in accordance with its variable degrees of practicability and foreign-
ness. Next we find the passivity implied by that relation of the self to the for-
eign, in the precise sense of the other (than) self, and so the otherness inherent 
in the relation of intersubjectivity. Finally we have the most deeply hidden pas-
sivity, that of the relation of the self to itself, which is conscience in the sense of 
Gewissen rather than Bewusstsein.42
Ricoeur clarifies this triad in ontological terms as a ‘broken attestation’. Or, to 
put it in another way, otherness is not added to selfhood from the outside but 
permeates it from within, undermining ideas that persons are founded in them-
selves. There is no self, there is only selfhood, which is inclusive of the other. 
The first angle to take in the triad refers to the otherness of the body. The body 
is the place of one’s belonging. It cannot be taken as an unchangeable identity, 
since in the encounter of physical suffering we experience that we are also 
patients of actions (corps-sujet). We endure passions that we cannot direct. Say-
ing that one has a bodily identity presupposes that we are subjected both 
inwardly and outwardly to influences that we can only control to some extent. 
I am limited in designing and reigning my body: in many cases it contradicts 
my will and the direction of the ego. I can ‘practice my body’ but not ‘make 
my body’. The second angle of the triad is the passivity of the otherness of 
other persons. Other people are not counterparts but constituents of the self. In 
Ricoeurs concise words: ‘the multiple ways in which the other than self affects 
the understanding of the self by itself marks, precisely, the difference between 
the ego that posits itself and the self that recognizes itself only through these 
very affections’.43 The other is implied in the addressee of my personal identity 
statements, namely as being the same that I was and will be (idem) and account-
able for what I did and will do (ipse). The notion that I am affected by others 
in stating who I am permeates personal identity to the bone: in my language, 
morality and actions. The last angle of the triad is the otherness of conscience. 
The voice of the other is not coming from the outside but from the inside. In 
accounting for my identity, I am confronted with the fact that multiple answers 
are possible and that it is I who has to decide. In clarifying these choices there 
is always is a perspective of suspicion present that asks for critical reflection. In 
such a hermeneutics of suspicion, the other is present, not only as my intimate 
other who might act as role model or act as contrast for my actions but espe-
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cially as the generalized other indicated in the Golden Rule or Kantian impera-
tive. 
The other being implied in each agent, is present in each situation that calls 
for moral action. This requires a practical wisdom to interpret particular situa-
tions as moral practices and to deal with them in an ethically adequate way. 
Ricoeur once again offers an appropriate analysis in his emphasis on prudence 
(frónjsiv), from which agents assess practices from moral norms and under 
recourse of ethical aims.44 In doing so, Ricoeur distinguishes what could be 
called ‘moral qualities’. These moral qualities can be defined by distinguishing 
on the one hand three lines of ethical argumentations: the teleological line that 
addresses ethical aims from the perspective of foundational values; the deonto-
logical line that addresses norms from the perspective of obligation; and the 
situation-philosophical line that addresses the actions themselves from the per-
spective of complex and problematic situations. At right angles of these lines of 
argumentation, Ricoeur distinguishes levels of analysis, framed in the ethical 
milestone: ‘aiming at the good life, with and for others, in just institutions’. 
From the teleological line of argumentation, an agent aims for the good as 
expressed in an agents’ self-esteem, and aims for friendship with and for others 
in a societal setting of justice. From a deontological perspective, an agent applies 
norms to action as is reflected in an agents’ respect towards himself which is 
rooted in autonomy, and respect for others which is rooted in reciprocity, both 
of which are safeguarded by applying principles of justice. Finally, from a situ-
ational-ethics perspective an agent acts within the vicissitudes of a situation that 
may lead to conflicting aims or aporia’s of duty. When there is no secure norm 
to meet this duty then aims or values offer the source and recourse for obliga-
tions. In taking these three perspectives, an agent balances ethical aims by let-
ting them pass through the sieve of the norms in applying them to practices. In 
doing so, conviction ultimately takes the lead in the moral judgment over an 
issue in a situation of conflict.45 
Thus, moral qualities require a balance of values and norms, as guided by 
convictions that infer this interpretation to the moral identity of an agent. 
However, in the setting of aporetic situations these convictions offer no philo-
sophically concluding evidence for guidance in moral action. Our action in 
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these situations is to some extent tragic, since we tend to evaluate aporetic situ-
ations as characterized by mythical adversaries that conflict with our intentions. 
We value these situations as blurring the choices we make vis-à-vis the inacces-
sible constraints of fate. And we may even experience these situations as one’s 
in which we redefine ourselves from acting agents into passive onlookers. Here, 
tragedy offers a narrative in-between between advice and resignation where 
tragic wisdom guides practical wisdom. It does so by recognizing and explicitly 
presenting the limits of guidance in action by introducing ‘ethicopractical apo-
ria’ to which practical wisdom responds. It is here where tragedy appeals to 
conviction, making ‘conviction the haven beyond catharsis’. It does so not by 
offering clear guidelines of conduct but by representing the conflicts that lead 
to moral problems that oblige agents to reorient their actions at their own risk 
and meet the ultimate limits that are implied in practical wisdom.46 Ricoeurs 
effort to fulfil the ethical requirements of universality throughout contextual 
conditions and aporias amounts into what he calls with Rawls ‘a reflective equi-
librium’: an attestation of arguing ethically while being faithful to well consid-
ered convictions.47 
Enacting Moral Qualities
The characterization of moral qualities ascribes actions to agents by designating 
these actions as good, obligatory and wise. In doing so, agents are imputable as 
persons, that is, they can be ascribed self-constancy (ipse) in their actions. What 
are the consequences of these considerations for defining liturgy as a moral 
practice? In answering this lead-question, I will first clarify the ethical signifi-
cance of enacting moral qualities, and subsequently point out three modes of 
this enactment in liturgical practice. 
What is the ethical significance of enacting moral qualities? This question 
first assumes that moral qualities are indeed enacted, that is performed, staged, 
re-presented. This seems to be at odds with their common denotation as found-
ing argumentation in action. However, we find these moral qualities to be not 
merely formal attributes of mental reasoning processes but propositions that are 
embedded in narratives of various genres, such as epics, comedies and tragedies. 
Especially in tragedy, which as we saw Aristotle considered the ultimate dra-
matic structure, moral qualities are emplotted well. Moral qualities are charac-
terized by a discordant concordance in a dynamic model of moral action and 
suffering, harmony and contingency, voluntariness and involuntariness, solu-
tions and aporia’s. The guiding line throughout this discordant concordance is 
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the characteristic that an action is imitated which is of a general truth, or – as 
Aristotle puts it – is ‘serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude’ (Poetica 
VI). But apart from the fact that we are confronted with moral qualities in nar-
ratives of different genres, there is a more basic distinction to be made. It relates 
to the fact that moral qualities belong to the reality domain that is governed by 
ethics while they are enacted in the imaginary domain that is governed by poet-
ics. Enacted actions can be understood as metaphorical since they connect real-
ity and imaginary domains.48 This metaphorical transposition has ethical sig-
nificance throughout. It for instance avoids formalism in ethics by putting 
moral qualities in a creative and even aesthetic context. It models these qualities 
by putting them in a plot-structure of a narrative to demonstrate their complex-
ity while installing expectations of an outcome for better or for worse. It dem-
onstrates the intrinsic link of moral qualities and the agent by putting the char-
acters in the effort of creating their – and each other’s – identity, especially in 
the sense of achieving self-constancy. To the extent that liturgical practices are 
characterized by a dramatic structure, the moral qualities that are expressed in 
liturgy can be understood as metaphorical: pointing at real life in which they 
have ethical significance but poetically referring to them for the moment as 
imagined and staged dispositions, that is, as ritual.
There are numerous examples of these ‘moral rituals’ in liturgy. In the pro-
fession of faith one installs a moral identity by attesting to certain shared prop-
ositions of belief. In doing so, not only are the articles of faith represented, but 
also one’s identity to be imputable as a person with regard to these articles. In 
confession, one represents one’s moral qualities within the transgressions, vicis-
situdes, conflicts and aporias of one’s life in order to assess and revalue them. 
In petitionary prayers, one takes the perspective of the other, be it God to 
whom one directs a prayer or by morally putting oneself in the shoes of the 
other that is addressed coram Deo. In the public reading of religious texts, one 
is addressed from the perspective of the moral qualities of the characters in the 
presented narrative. In sermons this narrative address is clarified by impelling, 
that is urging or motivating to take perspectives of certain religious characters, 
or by imputation, that is by indicting a public with moral claims appertaining 
to their ascribed religious identity. In liturgical ‘rites of passage’ one pays respect 
to those that are in crucial identity phases: starting identity (baptism/birth), 
sharing identity (matrimony/marriage), or concluding identity (funeral/death). 
In these rites of passage the moral stance reflects an attestation of central and 
serious value in which one states to be imputable to take care of the other. One 
can easily supplement examples like these with many others, which would 
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require an elaborated model of moral qualities applied to an analysis of liturgi-
cal practices. The point here however is merely to demonstrate that one can 
understand liturgy as a moral practice in a metaphorical sense. Liturgy links the 
real world of daily action, to be scrutinized from an ethical perspective to an 
imaginary world of dense representation, to be evaluated from an aesthetical or 
poetic perspective. As far as liturgy has significance from an ethical perspective, 
it primarily deals with moral qualities by enacting them. It represents moral 
qualities in terms of aims and obligations that appeal to the concrete lives of 
those that participate in liturgy. It asks them to look at their lives from the 
offered perspectives and guide them in that respect, while taking into account 
the disparate conditions of current situations. In respect of that, liturgy is a 
public presentation of a moral conviction.
If liturgy indeed has the sketched moral and ethical significance as enacted 
action, how is this enactment realized? In order to answer this question I take 
liturgy as a threefold poetic composition of moral qualities, by distinguishing 
between reference, mediation and invention, analogous to Ricoeur’s notions of 
mimßseiv1, mimßseiv2, and mimßseiv3 respectively.49 Reference in liturgy refers to 
the semantic, symbolic and syntagmatic structure that prefigures our under-
standing of liturgy. We understand moral qualities semantically by answering 
questions like ‘who acts morally?’, ‘how does one act morally?’, ‘why does one 
act morally?’, ‘with whom does one act morally?’, ‘to whom does one act mor-
ally?’. These questions are implicit in (Bible-)texts, in sermons, prayers, rites, 
etcetera. They form its intelligible structure open for reconstruction. The struc-
ture itself is symbolic, that is, not logically denotated but to be understood by 
convention and open for multiple references. And due to the narrative structure 
it is syntagmatic, it is successive by an ordering of depicted morally relevant 
events that invite to imitate. Apart from this prefigurative aspect that enables us 
to refer to moral action, there is a figurative aspect of mediation. Mediation 
refers to a connecting of moral pre-understanding in the available ‘material’ of 
liturgy (narratives, prayers, objects, rituals) to the diverse moral characteristics 
of the situation in which one lives. This is the central aspect of moral enact-
ment that we regard crucial for liturgical practice. Why? It relates the ‘moral 
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capital’ of a tradition to the here and now of those participating in liturgy. And 
it does so by imagination. Ricoeur here refers to the ‘kingdom of the as-if’: by 
actually configuring prefigured material in a meaningful way, imagination is 
stirred. It is the core skill of an ars celebrandi. The semantically implicit ques-
tions of the ‘who, why, how, with whom and to whom’ of moral action are 
answered in a rhetorically varied and appealing way before a liturgical public. 
In doing so, it re-describes the moral situation in which this public finds itself. 
It blazes a trail by arranging moral qualities in such a way that in face of dis-
cordance, concordance is realized. Since mediation belongs to the realm of the 
‘as-if’ there is every opportunity to arrange represented qualities, goals, means, 
agents, interactions, circumstances and (unexpected) results at different time 
perspectives. A moral necessity is put to the fore in which conceptual clarifica-
tion and succession in time are related in a unity of narrative or in the plausibil-
ity of rite. Configuration is varying what is univocally given. It demands that 
we take specific perspectives from which new things can be seen. Consequently, 
it impels or imputes us to do what is actually imagined. It is here where inven-
tion finally comes in as a third phase of enactment. The ‘as-if’-time of imagined 
action and the ‘real-time’ of presented action meet by invention. Invention is 
the inscription of imagined time into real-time. In our case, it requires an 
inscribing of the moral qualities of personal identity that were configured in 
liturgical practice, into the identity of selfhood as we experience ourselves in the 
life-world. To be clear, there is no direct line between liturgy and daily practice 
in the sense that moral qualities presented in liturgy bluntly act as model for 
moral action in daily life. The notion of ‘invention’ merely assumes that we 
creatively redefine our identity in terms of moral qualities. As soon as the dis-
course of moral action requires it, we attest this identity anew in the effort of 
designating our actions and those of others as good, obligatory and wise. We do 
so not without fear and pity, and usually in the tragic pursuit of a general truth 
in which these emotions are purged.
5. LITURGY AS RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
Finally, there is the question of the reality to which a spiritual practice of lit-
urgy refers. What can we hope for if we put our trust in the testimony of the 
liturgical text? Is liturgy a significant act or one in vain? Here a theological 
question is at stake. According to the aesthetical perspective of liturgical prac-
tice, the question of liturgy is not only a question of ‘good taste’ but also one 
of a general truth pursued. In elaborating the moral perspective, it became 
clear that this general truth firmly relates to our identity. As ‘firmly’ means 
‘the other implied’, we are moral beings to the bone in referring to one another. 
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In looking back on the views that both perspectives offered it also became 
clear that ultimate answers in poetics and ethics cannot be given on before-
hand. The pursuit of an ultimate perspective on beforehand seems to have 
tragic characteristics: a well-practiced effort at best. Does that observation hold 
for the religious perspective of liturgical practice as well, or are there ultimate 
perspectives that go beyond? In dealing with this question, I will address three 
issues. One relates to the relationship of morality and religion. The second 
issue refers to a basic religious structure of call and response. The third issue is 
that of the ultimate which addresses both our sufficiency and insufficiency in 
signifying God.
Morality and Religion
If one refutes modern tendencies to reduce religion to morality, the first ques-
tion to answer is what distinguishes religion from morality. In the case of lit-
urgy, this question has a particular significance. Though the liturgical acts ety-
mologically have a moral significance – like we saw in the first paragraph of this 
contribution –, the whole scope of religious ritual seems to centre on a reality 
that surpasses the discourse of practical action. In the previous paragraphs, we 
looked at liturgy as enacted action that mediates the reality domain governed 
by ethics through the imaginary domain governed by poetics. However, does 
this imply that morality, and beauty for that matter, provide necessary and suf-
ficient perspectives to define liturgy as religious practice? This question could 
easily be answered in the negative by simply pointing at a transcendent perspec-
tive that indeed is said to permeate liturgy and that refers not only to a reality 
set apart from our moral obligations, but also to a reality far beyond our imag-
ination. However, if one understands this reference as action – a perspective 
that indeed accurately describes liturgical practice – we are confronted with 
both an ethical and a theological issue. The ethical issue will confront us with 
a tension of relativism and universalism. The theological issue raises the issue of 
human and divine ontology.
The distinction of morality and religion confronts us in liturgy with a ten-
sion of ethical relativism and ethical universalism. Relativism holds that actual 
moral diversity (descriptive relativism) keeps us from a universal access to what 
is true and just (meta-ethical relativism) and withholds us from passing moral 
judgment towards practices other than our own (normative relativism). Uni-
versalism on the other hand holds that there are general ethical principles that 
– by definition – apply to anyone and that are therefore relevant for judging 
particular moral practices (cases). If one understands ethical reflection as a 
rational account of morality that is based on the universality of norms, then 
religious ritual is an extraordinary case. The rationality of ritual conduct seems 
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to appertain to conventions that are cherished by certain communities but 
rejected as insignificant by others. Therefore, if we consider liturgy as a moral 
practice, its religious characteristics compel to a relativist perspective of the 
moral qualities that are practiced in this liturgy. However, as we saw, from a 
Ricoeurian view one can understand this argument as faulty. Ricoeur can be 
called a universalist, but one who understands ethical argumentation as a 
dynamic process. The dynamic shows in the metaphor of the ‘sieve’, which says 
that aims need to be guided by norms in order to gain relevance for prudent 
judging. It does justice to ‘cases’ by understanding them as practices of agents 
whose convictions may prompt them to recur to aims as soon as norms fail to 
guide a prudent judgement within the vicissitudes and contingencies of these 
practices. The religious case of liturgy is not simply a case. At least, to the 
extent that universal ethical statements fail to address the ‘celebrated’ moral 
qualities in liturgy, one has to acknowledge the particularities of this case before 
a retreat into relativism. In our case, these particularities refer to a narrative 
structure of liturgy with readers in the effort of making sense of their own situ-
ation. And if they fail to adequately address this situation from a universal 
point of view, they recur to convictions that guide them with regard to the 
aims of their actions. It is here were a religious perspective – present in convic-
tions – appeals to morality. 
How is this religious perspective pursued? From a Ricoeurian perspective 
one can understand this as a figurative process, which Van der Ven50 elaborates 
in the following way. Religious convictions bind together aims and norms by 
connecting them with religious themes that present these aims and norms both 
as gift and as orientation towards a future. In presenting these aims and norms 
within a religious narrative, moral qualities to some extent change. In this figu-
rative process pre-moral, radical-moral and meta-moral aspects can be distin-
guished. In a pre-moral sense, religion determines the identity of a person as 
autonomous: a person has a freedom to act vor Gut und Böse. In religious nar-
ratives moral qualities are not so much available on beforehand, they are 
installed by confronting the freedom (to act) of one person with that of another. 
In a radical-moral sense, religion not so much emphasizes the authority of 
moral conventions. Actually, it does quite the opposite: it puts the plausibility 
and validity of aims and norms into the perspective of the particular. It are the 
parabolas from the religious narratives that not so much stress moral habit but 
have a counter-intuitive aim that puts moral conventions to the test, usually 
because they demonstrate the inadequacy of generalized norms within the con-
tingencies of specific situations. Religion enables a person to criticise, radicalize 
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or innovate moral qualities. In a meta-moral sense, religion displays and con-
fronts the boundaries of moral qualities in action. It does so by clarifying that 
moral practice is tied – but also committed – to a dialectic of activity and pas-
sivity, to a basic inaccessibility of personal intentions, aims and results of action, 
to the fragility and brokenness of the world. Religion offers a semantic and 
pragmatic framework of language to express these contingencies and to make 
the imperfect a theme of personal identity in contra-factual convictions. Liturgy 
configures this religious perspective in various ritual, narrative and rhetorical 
genres. In doing so, it demonstrates that the universal is only accessible through-
out the characteristics relative to the convictions of committed persons. 
In distinguishing morality from religion, a reflection of liturgical practices 
confronts us with a second theme. This is a theological issue, which refers to 
the ontology of man and of God. If liturgy deals with God, is there a God? An 
answer to that question is at stake in the very fact of liturgical practice: do we 
worship God, directed to His Glory, or do we symbolically pay tribute to one 
another and ourselves? In answering this question from a hermeneutical per-
spective, the implied ontological issues require a narrative approach. Ontology 
deals with questions of being, both in terms of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’. Frege’s 
classical distinction of Sinn (sense, signification) and Bedeutung (reference, des-
ignation, denotation) sharply distinguishes in language between unsaturated 
(dependent) entities (concepts) on the one hand and ‘saturated’ (independent) 
entities (persons, ‘God’ for that matter) on the other. Frege makes this distinc-
tion to clarify that while our referring maybe univocal, the meaning we attribute 
to it is polysemic. According to Ricoeur however, semiotic and semantic recon-
struction are closely related. Discourse always displays a dialectic of sense and 
reference: because we are (entities) in the world we have something to say.51 
Meaning is inclusive of the distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’. We can 
never escape our being affected and committed to the world in which we live. 
We get a glimpse of stating who we are and who God is from the perspective 
of texts, not of statements. While concepts denotate, it are persons who refer. 
It is here where the metaphor comes to life: it refers as word but displays its 
polysemic sense and innovative aim as text in the practice of language.52 From 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutical framework, one can indeed regard meaning as an 
umbrella term for explanation and interpretation. Explanation is the process 
according to which a text makes sense by ordering the parts of a text into a 
structure, whereas interpretation is the quest for a metaphor that makes the text 
understandable as referring to a whole. This posits the ontological question of 
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God’s being as question of personal meaning, to be addressed in metaphors and 
not in concepts. If there is a God, its ontology refers to das relative Absolute.53 
It demands both an explanation of texts that present God, and an interpreta-
tion of Gods significance. Liturgical practice is religious to the extent that it 
establishes this illuminative presentation of texts (explanation) and inspiring 
quest for metaphors (interpretation). I will pursue a clarification of this per-
spective in the following subparagraphs.
Call and Response 
If explanation and interpretation act as necessary – though not sufficient – con-
ditions for defining liturgy as religious, this requires choices for specific reli-
gious narratives. These choices are fivefold as they appertain to specific reli-
gions, particular canons, certain genres, given texts and chosen metaphors. 
Many choices are possible; the one does not on beforehand exclude the appro-
priateness of the other. The Bible presents a multiplicity of perspectives that 
enable a kerugmatik and revelatory interpretation both in the First Testament54 
and in the Second.55 As one illustrative and relevant choice of a hermeneutic 
approach to the religious character of liturgical practice, I will offer an example 
of monotheistic religion as it is revealed in the canon of the Old Testament, 
while focussing at the prophetic genre and limiting ourselves to vocational texts, 
choosing for the call and response metaphor in particular. 
There is a certain range of genres in the biblical canon. Especially the First 
Testament incorporates a variety of literary genres such as mythic, narrative, 
prescriptive, oracular, eschatological, apocalyptic, chiliastic, hymnic, sapiential, 
and prophetic.56 The choice for the latter genre is not one by coincidence. Pro-
phetic genres posit the self as respondent to propositions of meaning. These 
propositions stem from the symbolic network of monotheistic traditions. The 
prophetic genre understands the ‘I am’ of the person as the position of a 
respondent. It posits the self as a ‘summoned subject’.57 The summoned subject 
is a person who is committed to a hermeneutic practice of religious call and 
response. In choosing for this prophetic genre, I assign to the metaphor of call 
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and response a religious significance for the issue of personal identity. The met-
aphor of call and response draws attention to a central characteristic of voca-
tional texts, namely that they express an act of bearing witness. In fact, the 
juridical connotation is decisive: one is summoned to clarify – as if before a 
judge or jury – the truth of one’s statement, especially regarding crucial events 
that show a difference or clash of opinion. Both the sameness (idem) of a per-
son comes into play (was I really there?) and one’s credibility (ipse) is at stake 
(can I really be trusted?). In his identity, a person both vouches for a specific 
statement that refers to an external event (exteriorité), and demonstrates his 
personal involvement from which he will not withdraw (intériorité). In being a 
witness the both are connected.58 Freely following Ricoeur one might say that 
vocational literature stresses this unity as a dialectical process of communication 
between God and man. Addressing the call of God requires a personal bearing 
of a testimony (témoignage), whereas responding highlights that one actually 
commits oneself to this calling (attestation).59 Prophetic stories do indeed nar-
rate this, but on a more fundamental level, they also refer to the basic dialectic 
of faith itself. One hears God’s call and responds by answering. On the one 
hand, this is highly personal since one’s identity is at stake. On the other hand, 
this vocational structure is public, since it entails a mission for which one stands 
with this identity and can be openly scrutinized. This is a nuclear characteristic 
of what liturgy configures or ritualizes. 
According to Ricoeur, prophets belong to the category of ‘mediators’. As 
priest-stories refer to performed cult, kings-narratives to attained conquests and 
judges to displayed justice, so do prophets mediate a divine judgment. They 
explain a contemporary situation by clarifying it vis-à-vis the testimony that is 
handed over from former times. In addition, these prophetic stories interpret 
this testimony in terms of a judgment before an audience. Maybe unlike popu-
lar assumption suggests prophets derive their authority not by their own 
achievement. The First Testament tends to depict prophets as sufferers. They 
are prophets not because of their personal qualities but in spite of them. Proph-
ets usually fight their religious destiny; or to frame it in the wording of previous 
paragraphs, they tend to be tragic heroes. God calls them in spite of who they 
are. Prophets are reluctant respondents. This Biblical narrative element strikes 
me as significant for the moral nature of call as an appeal to the freedom of 
man to respond. Ricoeur points at the narrative dynamic of the personal char-
acter of calling as contrasted to the impersonal response. On the one hand, 
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calling is usually stated in the first-person, in the dialogical structure of the I-act 
of God’s Word, and the unique confession of an I-will as a response to this call. 
On the other hand, response is usually given in the third person, highlighting 
that authority is not based on personal merit but on acceptance that the call is 
from beyond. In an exegetical analysis of these vocational texts, the summoned 
subject is presented in a specific configuration.60 First, there is a confrontation 
with God that puts the subject into perspective: the prophet is insignificant in 
relation to God. What follows is an introductory speech in which God expresses 
His identity as relevant to the identity of the subject. Subsequently there is the 
assignment for a mission by God, in which however the prophet contrasts as an 
initial response the importance of this commission with the insignificance of 
his identity as a subject, which then God reassures again. Fact is however that 
the prophet is selected, that is, lifted out from his environment to address his 
own context anew. This address has characteristics of an instruction, remem-
bering the community in which he was an ordinary member before that, while 
emphasizing the commitment to the communities’ testimony, God’s covenant 
with them, recalling their shared vocation, and pointing at a religious future. 
Finally, in this commemorative act, a prophet is recognized as member of the 
genre, an example of prophetic speech.61 
If we can employ the image of call and response as an adequate metaphor for 
the identity characteristics of faith, this also appertains to the enactment of this 
faith in liturgy. The vocational structure of liturgical practice indeed shows a 
likewise structure of call and response in which participants act as summoned 
subjects who celebrate their vocation and mission as they understand this as 
originating in God. Liturgy is a communicative practice for which the call and 
response structure can be crucial in the following way. The call structure of 
liturgy arises out of the texts and practices that confront participants. In this 
reading, hearing is implied. These texts and practices refer since they recon-
struct this call as coming from God, and ask for a decoding of signs that lie 
embedded in these texts and practices (mimßseiv1). The response structure of 
liturgy results from the participants’ appropriation of these texts and practices 
in their own lives. These texts and practices have a capacity for invention, that 
is, they appeal to an encoding of signs anew as personal response to ‘God rec-
ognized’ in their own lives (mimßseiv3). Liturgy performs the crucial mediating 
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function of linking reference and invention by connecting the implied and the 
intended. To state it in formal terms: it takes the semiotic practice of liturgy 
(the symbolical acts) through its poetic practice (the rhetorical acts) into the 
moral practice (ethical acts). Liturgy restructures a religious narrative into a 
performance to facilitate a religious practice (mimßseiv2). The structure of pro-
phetic narrative acts as an appropriate biblical guide for that. 
To understand liturgy as an enactment seems to me crucial. Liturgy does not 
simply mediate between God and man, but between the reference to religious 
traditions on the one hand and the invention of religious practices on the other. 
In stating that, I am now able to solve an important problem that confronted 
us before when we were discussing the aesthetical practice of liturgy. It regards 
the position of the audience vis-à-vis staged agents. As participants of a religious 
practice, the public is not ‘onlooking’ but actively participating as a summoned 
audience. They are involved to the bone since they act in liturgy in the effort of 
explaining and interpreting the religious call and response that defines their 
faith. Moreover, in the act of participation it installs their identity as committed 
witnesses. In that act, the exegetical structure of the prophets reflects the reli-
gious characteristics of this liturgical practice by the faithful. They witness a 
confrontation with God in God’s declaration of His Autonomy. Subsequently, 
it is their – tragic – effort to understand God’s call as personal destiny. In addi-
tion, the faithful vouch for a responsibility to respond on His behalf while 
addressing anew a community to which they formerly merely belonged as casual 
members. Finally, they become the faithful in the act of installing their identity 
in a perennial tradition of witnesses. This is the practice of liturgy as shared 
committed and ritualized practice. Liturgy however remains to be performed 
within the ‘kingdom of the as-if’. Liturgy is not a divine but a human effort. 
This observation is crucial to understand the liturgical practice of summoned 
subjects in modern times. Liturgy involves an interpretative task to mediate 
‘autonomous’ conscience (coram seipso) and obedience of faith (coram Deo). 
Conscience requires the responsible judging of the self, whereas obedience 
implies the necessity to interpret the symbolic network appertaining to salva-
tion.62 Without this recognition, the prophetic genre and the metaphor of call 
and response fail to be understood as a configuration for liturgical practice.
The Ultimate
I started the former subparagraph by clarifying the explanatory and interpreta-
tive functions of liturgy as necessary conditions for religious practice. We how-
ever do not define liturgical practices sufficiently if we disregard the perspective 
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of the ultimate. Even if one agrees that we adequately understand liturgy as 
practice in the faith metaphor of call and response, one final question remains. 
If we are witnesses, of what or before who are we? What, or who, is the ulti-
mate? Is there any way to practice an ultimate perspective in liturgy? In answer-
ing these questions, I will first refer to the ultimate in terms of a relevant bibli-
cal pericope, namely that of God’s disclosure of His Name to Moses (Ex 3:14).63 
Subsequently, I will clarify if, how and to what extent liturgy can practice this 
ultimate perspective.
The call-response experience indicates a witnessing of ultimate reality. The 
very fact of ‘witnessing’ presumes that the reality of the ultimate is not one 
disconnected from our own but one closely related to our identity. A relevant 
example to illustrate this proposition is Gods disclosure of His Name to Moses. 
This narrative shows two crucial elements of the ultimate that falsify a notion 
of Gods identity as one that is opposed to ours. One element is dialogical; the 
other is action-oriented. 
The dialogical element of the ultimate shows in the fact that Gods disclosure 
of His Name is posited in a vocational narrative. The calling of Moses by God 
is one in dialogue. After the manifestation of the angel of the Lord in a burning 
bush, God calls Moses from this bush (Ex 3:4) and following God’s account of 
his covenant, Moses asks for God’s Name. Moses does so to clothe his author-
ity before his people as one who validly took up the mission that God requires 
from him (Ex 3:13). God replies to Moses’ question by saying ‘I am who I am’ 
(eiea rwa eiea; ego sum qui sum), immediately followed by ‘Say (…) I-am-
who-I-am has sent me to you’ (Ex 3:14). It takes a lot of talking before Moses 
– reluctantly – responds by accepting this mission and guide his people out of 
Egypt (Ex 4:20). At closer look there are two dialogues, one explicit and one 
implicit. The explicit dialogue is that of Gods’ call and Moses response, which 
puts Moses in the position of a summoned subject. The implicit dialogue is 
that of Moses’ relationship to his people, which puts Moses in the position of 
a commissioned subject. This Moses story shows that the ultimate is inclusive 
of the personal relationship of God and man as expressed in call and response, 
but it is also one relative to the mission to be pursued by the one who is called 
and responds. The summoned subject and the commissioned subject go 
together. There is no question to the ultimate character of Moses’ disclosure 
experience. However, God by no means shows Himself as one who transcends 
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Moses’ interpretative capacities. On the contrary, God puts Himself into dia-
logue and he does so in order to let Moses dialogize with his people. 
An action-oriented element of the ultimate refers to Gods Name itself, which 
assents to this dialogue by expressing presence instead of being. In the ‘I-am-
who-I-am’, God reveals his Name not as a proposition but as an ongoing action 
that intervenes in current events. God is not simply there, regardless of a pub-
lic, but present, that is, approachable to somebody. To state it in formal terms, 
Gods theophany is of performative nature. God’s Name is an action itself, 
unveiling that which cannot be grasped, but while displaying also appealing to 
the ultimate concern of that event. It uncloses what dialogue in the end cannot 
do but close. On the other hand, however, this ultimate concern cannot be 
interpreted apart from the signs and symbols that treasure this concern from 
the past and that nourish hope as unconditional trust in the future.64 This 
divine action of Gods’ Name therefore requires respect and reverence: it ‘elicits 
recognition and worship as the recipients are not just made privy to a divine 
secret but are the objects of an act of salvation’.65 The unaccomplished tense of 
the Name emphasises this action as a disclosure of Gods dialogue with man. 
After Gods account of his presence in the past he pulls the future into perspec-
tive as an act of speech. In doing so, He installs a tension between past and 
future; He hides and reveals; He represents the known and the unknown. Tra-
dition did not emphasise this action-aspect. On the contrary, it highlighted an 
essentialist characteristic of being. It took the ‘I-am-who-I-am’ as revealed by 
God to Moses from the Hebrew context and Judaic view into a Latin context 
and Greek metaphysical scheme. This requires a Christian effort to ‘dehellenize’ 
its onto-theology by re-understanding what God’s ‘being’ is from a Biblical 
perspective. It can only do so in recognition of the fact that Gods Name con-
fronts us with a polysemic structure that represents a ‘gap of meaning’ that 
directs the reader to an enigma. Being therefore is something that requires faith 
to leave open what cannot be said.66
The inaccessibility of Gods identity on the one hand and the need to address 
this identity as our ultimate concern in signs and symbols on the other hand 
takes us to the core of liturgical practice. Can we express and address the ulti-
mate perspective, as it lies embedded in our concerns? Liturgy indeed does so. 
But, again from a Ricoeurian perspective, it can only do so in recognition of a 
dialectic of silence and speech. Hermeneutics on the one hand cannot offer a 
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solution to the divine enigma while on the other hand its effort is to maintain 
that it can. Ricoeur clarifies this dialectic as one of manifestation and proclama-
tion.67 Manifestation refers to an anti-hermeneutical aspect of the ultimate. Its 
phenomenology is expressed in the sacred. The sacred is to be understood as 
manifestation of an overwhelming power, as Otto explained in his phenomenol-
ogy of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans. Following Eliade, Ricoeur points 
at the notion of hierophany to indicate that the sacred is always located at spe-
cific times and places and is expressed in a transformation of elements of pro-
fane reality. This transformation displays a bond of solidarity between sacred 
and natural powers. Natural elements such as sky, earth, water, and fire explain 
the immanence of the ultimate in everyday reality. Usually, this transformation 
has non-linguistic elements in the ritual. To see nature as sacred involves an act 
of sacralization, of consecration. Ritual joins the casual and the ultimate. Ele-
ments of nature or of daily life gain an ‘efficacy’ that they did not display before. 
This ‘bound symbolism’ invites to an aesthetical judgment. Manifestation 
remains a confrontation with natural reality, but in its transparency for a sacred 
universe. Manifestation reflects a ‘law of correspondence’ between profane and 
sacred reality. Proclamation on the other hand is typically hermeneutical in that 
it emphasizes the Word of God, the historicity of tradition and the explanation 
and interpretation that it requires. Whereas manifestation is based on natural 
symbolism, a cyclical ordering of time, and an aesthetic appreciation; proclama-
tion requires conceptual symbolism, a historic interpretation of time and an 
ethical assessment. Proclamation is oriented towards discourse in which the 
explanation and interpretation of the ultimate takes place. It discloses meaning 
from texts, and makes readers into hearers summoned to the mission that the 
text requires. 
In liturgical practice, manifestation can be taken as the element of the ulti-
mate that is expressed in sacraments. Ritual presents natural symbolism. It makes 
elements of nature’s universe translucent for a sacred universe. It mediates the 
immanence of the ultimate. Proclamation on the other hand can be taken as 
kerugma in which the Word of God is explained and interpreted. It mediates 
the decoding and encoding of the texts in which the testimony of tradition can 
be invented in daily life. The two go together; they require the imaginative capa-
bilities without which reality is nihilistic with regard to the polysemy of signs, 
texts, codes and metaphors of the religious traditions. What can be said of reli-
gious classics in literature can be maintained for the liturgical tradition as well, 
namely that it ‘figures rich and full projections of another way of being in the 
world that liberates what is essential by suggesting what is possible’.68
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